Role of the 28th (Maori) Battalion
The 28th (Maori) Battalion’s attack on the Cassino railway station epitomized the qualities that made it one of the most effective fighting units in the allied army. Deployed as the second component of Freyberg’s strategy to break the Gustav line, the 28th Battalion was to launch the offensive at Cassino on the 17th of February, the same night as the Indian Division’s attack on the monastery. If successfully implemented, the conflict would result in a breach of the German defence surrounding Cassino, and would allow an attack force of 180 American tanks and a similar number from the New Zealand 4th Armoured Brigade to exploit the opening and invest the town of Cassino itself (J.F. Cody, 28 Maori Battalion, 1956). An integral part of the conjoint attack, the success of the battle would be the turning point for the allied war in Italy. Divisional Commander General Kippenberger testified to the importance of the attack to the success of the allied operation:
“If we could hold the railway station, the operation would go on with a fair prospect of success, whether the Indians succeeded, had partial success, or failed. If we failed to take the station or lost our toe-hold there, then the operation ended and we would not have lost heavily” (J.F. Cody, 1956).
As a result, a strategy was carefully devised to maximise the opportunity for allied victory. According to the war diaries of the 28th Battalion, the attack was to be performed by A and B companies, with C and D in reserve for any reinforcing requirements. As dictated by the orders issued on the 17th of February, A Company was to capture two objectives with the more prominent of these being the railway yards of the station. Subsequently, the Company would advance on the hill feature to the south of its position colloquially labelled the ‘Hummock’ (J.F. Cody, 1956). B Company was to engage a separate set of objectives, comprised of the railway station buildings and the 300 meters of road that led directly to the town of Cassino. After securing the key objectives, the allied troops were to defend the area while engineers conducted the repairs of the railway tracks and bridges to create the conditions for an armoured exploitation of the penetrated German defence. In order to further the chance of allied success, the battalion executed reconnaissance operations to determine the veracity of the intelligence concerning the terrain of the area, and the integrity of the German defensive position surrounding the station. Preceding the attack, on the night of the 14th of February, two patrols were deployed to fulfil these goals. The first patrol, led by 2nd Lieutenant G. Takarua, sought to “probe enemy defences in the area of Cassino railway station and test enemy strength” (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). Ultimately, this objective was fulfilled as after progressing little over 250m from the start line, the allied patrol encountered enemy opposition. A brief exchange of machine-gun fire ensued, and the patrol successfully retreated with no casualties, and an enhanced understanding of the expanse of the German defence. Simultaneously, the second patrol, led by Seargent Rivers, set out to explore the terrain of the intended avenue of approach to the railway station. During their traverse of the proposed route, they found that the water that had previously covered the terrain had dissipated and although the ground was still soft, it was sufficient for an allied attack. The scene was set for the 28th (Maori) Battalion’s infamous assault on Cassino railway station.
Immediately before the launch of the offensive, concentrated artillery barrage emanating from two batteries of the American artillery and regiments of medium gunfire was laid on Cassino and the adjacent military objectives28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). After enduring the initial bombardment, at 2045 hours both attacking companies crossed the start line and commenced the march towards the imminent conflict. Despite the inspection of the terrain by the allied patrols, the unpredictable nature of the weather came to the fore and resulted in the gathering of a layer of water, submerging the approach to the railway station. With more difficult conditions, the battalion’s advance was hindered allowing the enemy forces to launch their own retaliatory artillery fire on the exposed allied position (J.F. Cody, 1956). From the outset the strategy encountered obstructions as an artillery blast broke the wireless communication set operated by Captain Wikiriwhi, and destroyed the communication between companies. Furthermore, the advance was delayed by German fire from the town of Cassino and the monastery slopes, and the unfavourable terrain including the creeks, swamp and the semi-submerged German minefield (J.F. Cody, 1956). Despite these factors, the battalion persevered and maintained its momentum under the intrepid leadership of Maori Commanders. After bypassing a stretch of barbed wire, the two companies abandoned their unified fighting style in favour of independent conflicts in order to secure the allied control of the first objective. A member of A Company described the scene as:
“…Sections and groups of men were having scraps all over the place- a few prisoners here and there a few dead Jerries…” (J.F. Cody, 1956)
By this stage in the battle, 2400 hours, B Company had captured the area immediately surrounding the railway station and was advancing on its second objective: the road to Cassino (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). Unfortunately, allied artillery had been ineffectual in dislodging the German defensive positions within the houses along the road. Consequently, a second battle arose as the battalion attempted to grapple for control of the area, resulting in 20 casualties. Subsequent to the company’s successful capture of the road, the engineers were able to commence their work, under the protection of B Company, on creating the opportunity for the allied tanks to advance along highway 6 and exploit the opening into the previously inaccessible Liri Valley. However, these efforts had to be halted at 0400 hours as the enemy initiated heavy strafing fire on the railway position and their infantry attempted to perform flanking manoeuvres to recapture the station and destroy the allied offensive (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). As a result of the break in communication and the inability to lay direct lines because of the unrelenting artillery, B Company had received very little information as to the progress of A company until 0700 hours when 2nd Lieutenant W.E. Jones conveyed the situation of the company (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). It became apparent that during the course of the advance on its second objective, the company had encountered more extensive wire obstacles and a swollen 20-foot stream that had not initially appeared to be a threat. Colonel Young reported:
“A Company still held up and are looking for another way through although the enemy is still firing from the Hummocks. Commanding officer still confident that he can capture the objective by first light… Engineers are prepared to work on in daylight under cover of smoke… Once the bridge is finished pass the armour through” (J.F. Cody, 1956).
Allied strategy took a turn for the worse when at 0300 hours; the moon came out and illuminated the field allowing German troops to initiate precision artillery fire to disrupt the engineers' efforts. Despite the commitment to operating during daylight, the battalion headquarters made the executive decision to withdraw these units for later use and instructed A and B companies to consolidate the control of the station under smoke cover (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). In these strenuous conditions, the Maori troops managed to successfully resist a number of German attempts at overrunning the station, however when they requested reinforcements to bolster the loss of 76 young Maori, the responding platoon was decimated by enemy fire and forced to retreat. The battalion was truly isolated from reinforcement as infantry support proved to be impossible and armoured involvement was infeasible due to the difficult terrain (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944).
Notwithstanding the courageous defence of the railway station, the smoke utilized by the allies to conceal their position was inherently flawed as it negated the allied use of artillery as fear of hitting their own troops, and allowed German counter-attacks to mass in close proximity without being observed. Although the Maori occupied a defendable position and successfully repelled German infantry attacks, one of these counter-attacks was ultimately successful as it incorporated the use of tanks. Consequently, the order was given to retreat to the start line and withdraw from the conflict to minimise the casualties that would occur as a result of the overwhelming German counterattack. The casualties in the 28th Battalion now totaled 128 men. This in effect marked the end of the Second Battle of Monte Cassino.
While the battle itself was unsuccessful, its importance in the accumulative sequence of events that ultimately led to the fall of the German position at Monte Cassino cannot be underplayed. The 28th (Maori) Battalion’s attack at the railway station has become a significant historical event for New Zealand society. Furthermore, while the conjoint assault on the 17th of February was unsuccessful, the battle had substantial cultural implications for our country, and these implications
“If we could hold the railway station, the operation would go on with a fair prospect of success, whether the Indians succeeded, had partial success, or failed. If we failed to take the station or lost our toe-hold there, then the operation ended and we would not have lost heavily” (J.F. Cody, 1956).
As a result, a strategy was carefully devised to maximise the opportunity for allied victory. According to the war diaries of the 28th Battalion, the attack was to be performed by A and B companies, with C and D in reserve for any reinforcing requirements. As dictated by the orders issued on the 17th of February, A Company was to capture two objectives with the more prominent of these being the railway yards of the station. Subsequently, the Company would advance on the hill feature to the south of its position colloquially labelled the ‘Hummock’ (J.F. Cody, 1956). B Company was to engage a separate set of objectives, comprised of the railway station buildings and the 300 meters of road that led directly to the town of Cassino. After securing the key objectives, the allied troops were to defend the area while engineers conducted the repairs of the railway tracks and bridges to create the conditions for an armoured exploitation of the penetrated German defence. In order to further the chance of allied success, the battalion executed reconnaissance operations to determine the veracity of the intelligence concerning the terrain of the area, and the integrity of the German defensive position surrounding the station. Preceding the attack, on the night of the 14th of February, two patrols were deployed to fulfil these goals. The first patrol, led by 2nd Lieutenant G. Takarua, sought to “probe enemy defences in the area of Cassino railway station and test enemy strength” (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). Ultimately, this objective was fulfilled as after progressing little over 250m from the start line, the allied patrol encountered enemy opposition. A brief exchange of machine-gun fire ensued, and the patrol successfully retreated with no casualties, and an enhanced understanding of the expanse of the German defence. Simultaneously, the second patrol, led by Seargent Rivers, set out to explore the terrain of the intended avenue of approach to the railway station. During their traverse of the proposed route, they found that the water that had previously covered the terrain had dissipated and although the ground was still soft, it was sufficient for an allied attack. The scene was set for the 28th (Maori) Battalion’s infamous assault on Cassino railway station.
Immediately before the launch of the offensive, concentrated artillery barrage emanating from two batteries of the American artillery and regiments of medium gunfire was laid on Cassino and the adjacent military objectives28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). After enduring the initial bombardment, at 2045 hours both attacking companies crossed the start line and commenced the march towards the imminent conflict. Despite the inspection of the terrain by the allied patrols, the unpredictable nature of the weather came to the fore and resulted in the gathering of a layer of water, submerging the approach to the railway station. With more difficult conditions, the battalion’s advance was hindered allowing the enemy forces to launch their own retaliatory artillery fire on the exposed allied position (J.F. Cody, 1956). From the outset the strategy encountered obstructions as an artillery blast broke the wireless communication set operated by Captain Wikiriwhi, and destroyed the communication between companies. Furthermore, the advance was delayed by German fire from the town of Cassino and the monastery slopes, and the unfavourable terrain including the creeks, swamp and the semi-submerged German minefield (J.F. Cody, 1956). Despite these factors, the battalion persevered and maintained its momentum under the intrepid leadership of Maori Commanders. After bypassing a stretch of barbed wire, the two companies abandoned their unified fighting style in favour of independent conflicts in order to secure the allied control of the first objective. A member of A Company described the scene as:
“…Sections and groups of men were having scraps all over the place- a few prisoners here and there a few dead Jerries…” (J.F. Cody, 1956)
By this stage in the battle, 2400 hours, B Company had captured the area immediately surrounding the railway station and was advancing on its second objective: the road to Cassino (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). Unfortunately, allied artillery had been ineffectual in dislodging the German defensive positions within the houses along the road. Consequently, a second battle arose as the battalion attempted to grapple for control of the area, resulting in 20 casualties. Subsequent to the company’s successful capture of the road, the engineers were able to commence their work, under the protection of B Company, on creating the opportunity for the allied tanks to advance along highway 6 and exploit the opening into the previously inaccessible Liri Valley. However, these efforts had to be halted at 0400 hours as the enemy initiated heavy strafing fire on the railway position and their infantry attempted to perform flanking manoeuvres to recapture the station and destroy the allied offensive (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). As a result of the break in communication and the inability to lay direct lines because of the unrelenting artillery, B Company had received very little information as to the progress of A company until 0700 hours when 2nd Lieutenant W.E. Jones conveyed the situation of the company (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). It became apparent that during the course of the advance on its second objective, the company had encountered more extensive wire obstacles and a swollen 20-foot stream that had not initially appeared to be a threat. Colonel Young reported:
“A Company still held up and are looking for another way through although the enemy is still firing from the Hummocks. Commanding officer still confident that he can capture the objective by first light… Engineers are prepared to work on in daylight under cover of smoke… Once the bridge is finished pass the armour through” (J.F. Cody, 1956).
Allied strategy took a turn for the worse when at 0300 hours; the moon came out and illuminated the field allowing German troops to initiate precision artillery fire to disrupt the engineers' efforts. Despite the commitment to operating during daylight, the battalion headquarters made the executive decision to withdraw these units for later use and instructed A and B companies to consolidate the control of the station under smoke cover (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944). In these strenuous conditions, the Maori troops managed to successfully resist a number of German attempts at overrunning the station, however when they requested reinforcements to bolster the loss of 76 young Maori, the responding platoon was decimated by enemy fire and forced to retreat. The battalion was truly isolated from reinforcement as infantry support proved to be impossible and armoured involvement was infeasible due to the difficult terrain (28th (Maori) Battalion- War Diaries, 1st February-29th February 1944).
Notwithstanding the courageous defence of the railway station, the smoke utilized by the allies to conceal their position was inherently flawed as it negated the allied use of artillery as fear of hitting their own troops, and allowed German counter-attacks to mass in close proximity without being observed. Although the Maori occupied a defendable position and successfully repelled German infantry attacks, one of these counter-attacks was ultimately successful as it incorporated the use of tanks. Consequently, the order was given to retreat to the start line and withdraw from the conflict to minimise the casualties that would occur as a result of the overwhelming German counterattack. The casualties in the 28th Battalion now totaled 128 men. This in effect marked the end of the Second Battle of Monte Cassino.
While the battle itself was unsuccessful, its importance in the accumulative sequence of events that ultimately led to the fall of the German position at Monte Cassino cannot be underplayed. The 28th (Maori) Battalion’s attack at the railway station has become a significant historical event for New Zealand society. Furthermore, while the conjoint assault on the 17th of February was unsuccessful, the battle had substantial cultural implications for our country, and these implications