Strategic Purpose of the Battles of Monte Cassino
Causes for the Battles of Cassino
Between 1943 and 1944, allied progress on the Italian front had reached a standstill, and the allied commanders sought to revive their campaign by exploiting their control of the seas surrounding Italy. Effective German defence along the Gustav line was a significant contributor to the stagnant assault; however, it was also perpetuated by the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare (Dr Christopher Pugsley, 2004). It became evident through the course of the campaign that the American and British managerial counterparts could not agree on the purpose and execution of the Italian Campaign, which consequently led to disagreement as to the mechanism to break the deadlock. Eventually, it was decided to implement a conjoint assault that materialized on two fronts: Anzio and Monte Cassino. Anzio was planned as an amphibious landing behind the Gustav line, aided by the support of American naval transports, which aimed to cut the lines of communication for Germans south of Rome. Simultaneously, the US Fifth Army, led by General Mark Clark and supported by the French Expeditionary Force, would lead the mutually supportive attack that intended to exploit the advantages of Anzio, and break through into the Liri Valley to advance on Rome. Despite the thorough preparation and intrepid leadership of allied forces, the attempt at Anzio failed due to logistical complexities of a purely naval-based assault and an effective German resistance. Contrary to the intended rapid advance along the Italian Peninsula, the failed Anzio offensive resulted in a long-term stationary war. In the words of one British military historian:
“In the event the roles of Anzio and Cassino were reversed. On the allied side Cassino became the rescuer of Anzio instead of Anzio helping to create conditions for a breakthrough at Cassino” (Dr. Christopher Pugsley, 2004)
As a result of the failed Anzio attack, causing a prolonged coastal engagement, the Battles of Cassino became the crucial initiative to allow the allies to circumvent the reinforced and heavily defended Gustav line.
First Battle of Cassino
Preceding the New Zealand Corps’ costly debut in the Italian Campaign, the scene was set for a protracted stationary war, not dissimilar to the devastating battles of World War I. General Mark Clark, who commanded the US Fifth Army, headed the First Battle of Cassino (12th January-9th February 1944) and soon discovered the extent of the German defensive network surrounding the town and the Appienne mountains. The strategy employed by Clark was to bypass Monte Cassino and launch flanking attacks through the mountains surrounding the monastery and the German position. Subsequently, the American forces would perform the crucial push up route 6 in the Liri valley, as the predominating German position would be engaged with the British and French offensive. This strategy was initially planned to entice German troops away from their defence of Rome, and away from the forthcoming attack at Anzio. Although the strategy would make redundant the established German defensive position, the course of the battle took a very different shape then planned.
On the 17th of January, the first attack occurred as the 56th and 5th Divisions of the British X Corps crossed the Garigliano River and confronted the German position on the coastal section of the Gustav line, to the left of a 30km front (Dr. Christopher Pugsley, 2004). Although the execution of this offensive was particularly effective, the allies were not able to exploit the strategic gains made due to a lack of reserves and an erroneous assumption of the strength of the German defense. Following this, the ensuing attack on the 24th of January proved to be the most intensive conflict of the first battle. After an ineffectual incursion on the 20th, which was thwarted due to lack of preparation and difficult terrain, General Clark adopted a more aggressive and retaliatory stance. The major offensive was performed by the 36th Infantry Division of the US II Corps, and supported by the French Expeditionary Force. The utilized strategy was employed as an ostensible escapade into the mountains behind Monte Cassino, with the ultimate intention to double back and advance on the monastery from the strategically superior higher ground. In support of this attack, the French Forces implemented a similar approach and challenged the German positions on the adjacent mountains. After eight days of fighting, American forces conquered point 445, situated no more than 370 meters from the monastery itself. However, due to the extensive enhancement of the Gustav line defenses, through the use of natural terrain features, and the superior German defense, the Americans never captured the elusive point 593, which was the final obstruction before the monastery could be taken. As a result, the First Battle of Monte Cassino came to an end, opening the door for Lieutenant-General Freyberg and the 2nd New Zealand Division to assume control of the offensive.
Strategy and objectives of the Second Battle of Cassino
There were many compelling incentives for Freyberg to exact a successful offensive at Cassino. Not only did he have his reputation as a newly appointed Corps commander in question, but he also represented the only substantial New Zealand force in World War II. In light of the results achieved by the First Battle of Cassino, and the strategic magnitude of the upcoming attack, the onus was on Freyberg to implement an effective force and accomplish the necessary results. The German opposition, the XIV Panzer Corps, consisted of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 44th Hoch and Deutschmeister Infantry Division and the 5th Mountain Division. Occupying a fortified point, strategy was an integral prerequisite for the success of the operation. As a result, Freyberg and his fellow commanders had to consider the factors that would influence the course of the conflict, and what advantages the allies could exploit in order to succeed. Unfortunately, many of the advantages they identified, such as the allied tank superiority, were annulled by the German manipulation of terrain to obstruct the allied campaign (John A. Ciciarelli, 20 Fields of Battle: Terrain in Military History, 2002). One such obstruction was the installment of a dam on the Rapido River to cause flooding. Consequently, this meant that in planning for the attack, Freyberg had to put more emphasis on the use of infantry, as there was little room for the effective use of tank support due to the difficult terrain (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Alongside the setback of having to develop new tactics, the German position on Monte Cassino also had to be considered as it was well established and fully supplied. As a result, the allies had to employ a strategy that also catered to this factor.
Initially, Freyberg worked alongside Major-General Francis Tuker, the leader of the 4th Indian Division, to establish the key objectives of the 2nd Battle of Cassino. Ultimately, their goal was to threaten the integrity of the Gustav line in order to advance up the Italian Peninsula and draw troops away from the conflict at Anzio. To achieve these objectives, Major-General Tuker suggested a multi-front offensive that comprised of attacks either side of Via Cassalina, as this would succeed in isolating the Germans at Monte Cassino (James Holland, The Approach to Battle, 2000). Concurrently, another attack would occur on the second front further down the Rapido River and advance up the Liri Valley, similar to the British X Corps’ attempt in the preceding battle. Upon proposing this strategy, Tuker asserted that the impetus for doing so was that he thought, “A penetration through the hills to the east of the Cassino feature or across the Rapido lower down, somewhere near St Angelo would have brought the Axis hurrying back from Anzio far more readily than bashing one’s head against the rocks of Cassino” (James Holland, 2000). Freyberg and the other commanding officers endorsed this strategy. Unfortunately however, Tuker fell ill shortly after the plan was devised and without his presence, Freyberg lost confidence and reverted to his own method, which bore a resemblance to the ill-fated frontal assault alluded to by Tuker.
In lieu of the previous plan, Freyberg essentially proposed a giant ‘pincer’ movement, which aimed to break the German defensive position at the monastery and capture the town itself. Although similar to the previous mechanism utilized by the US Fifth army under Clark, Freyberg believed that the incorporation of an attack at the Cassino railway station would expose a viable pathway to the town and the Liri valley. According to the war diaries of the 2nd New Zealand Division, the main assault was to emerge on two fronts. On one front, the 28th (Maori) Battalion was to bridge the Rapido River and capture both the Cassino Railway station and the adjacent hill feature. A and B companies of the battalion would execute this task, and maintain control until armored forces could capitalize on the opening and advance towards Monte Cassino (28th (Maori) Battalion- war diaries, 1st February- 29th February 1944). Simultaneously, on the second front the 4th Indian Division, headed by the 7th Brigade which comprised of the 1st Royal Sussex, 4/16th Punjab Rifles and 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, would advance along higher ground and capture the monastery before progressing to invest the town of Cassino from the southwest (Matthew Parker, Monte Cassino: The Story of the Hardest Fought Battle of World War II, 2004). Subsequent to these two attacks, the New Zealand and Indian forces would unite and proceed up the Liri valley. The success of the operation would lead to the breaking of the Gustav line and a reprieve for the allies at Anzio. The strategy would destroy the key defensive networks established by the Germans and create the opportunity to progress towards Rome.
Between 1943 and 1944, allied progress on the Italian front had reached a standstill, and the allied commanders sought to revive their campaign by exploiting their control of the seas surrounding Italy. Effective German defence along the Gustav line was a significant contributor to the stagnant assault; however, it was also perpetuated by the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare (Dr Christopher Pugsley, 2004). It became evident through the course of the campaign that the American and British managerial counterparts could not agree on the purpose and execution of the Italian Campaign, which consequently led to disagreement as to the mechanism to break the deadlock. Eventually, it was decided to implement a conjoint assault that materialized on two fronts: Anzio and Monte Cassino. Anzio was planned as an amphibious landing behind the Gustav line, aided by the support of American naval transports, which aimed to cut the lines of communication for Germans south of Rome. Simultaneously, the US Fifth Army, led by General Mark Clark and supported by the French Expeditionary Force, would lead the mutually supportive attack that intended to exploit the advantages of Anzio, and break through into the Liri Valley to advance on Rome. Despite the thorough preparation and intrepid leadership of allied forces, the attempt at Anzio failed due to logistical complexities of a purely naval-based assault and an effective German resistance. Contrary to the intended rapid advance along the Italian Peninsula, the failed Anzio offensive resulted in a long-term stationary war. In the words of one British military historian:
“In the event the roles of Anzio and Cassino were reversed. On the allied side Cassino became the rescuer of Anzio instead of Anzio helping to create conditions for a breakthrough at Cassino” (Dr. Christopher Pugsley, 2004)
As a result of the failed Anzio attack, causing a prolonged coastal engagement, the Battles of Cassino became the crucial initiative to allow the allies to circumvent the reinforced and heavily defended Gustav line.
First Battle of Cassino
Preceding the New Zealand Corps’ costly debut in the Italian Campaign, the scene was set for a protracted stationary war, not dissimilar to the devastating battles of World War I. General Mark Clark, who commanded the US Fifth Army, headed the First Battle of Cassino (12th January-9th February 1944) and soon discovered the extent of the German defensive network surrounding the town and the Appienne mountains. The strategy employed by Clark was to bypass Monte Cassino and launch flanking attacks through the mountains surrounding the monastery and the German position. Subsequently, the American forces would perform the crucial push up route 6 in the Liri valley, as the predominating German position would be engaged with the British and French offensive. This strategy was initially planned to entice German troops away from their defence of Rome, and away from the forthcoming attack at Anzio. Although the strategy would make redundant the established German defensive position, the course of the battle took a very different shape then planned.
On the 17th of January, the first attack occurred as the 56th and 5th Divisions of the British X Corps crossed the Garigliano River and confronted the German position on the coastal section of the Gustav line, to the left of a 30km front (Dr. Christopher Pugsley, 2004). Although the execution of this offensive was particularly effective, the allies were not able to exploit the strategic gains made due to a lack of reserves and an erroneous assumption of the strength of the German defense. Following this, the ensuing attack on the 24th of January proved to be the most intensive conflict of the first battle. After an ineffectual incursion on the 20th, which was thwarted due to lack of preparation and difficult terrain, General Clark adopted a more aggressive and retaliatory stance. The major offensive was performed by the 36th Infantry Division of the US II Corps, and supported by the French Expeditionary Force. The utilized strategy was employed as an ostensible escapade into the mountains behind Monte Cassino, with the ultimate intention to double back and advance on the monastery from the strategically superior higher ground. In support of this attack, the French Forces implemented a similar approach and challenged the German positions on the adjacent mountains. After eight days of fighting, American forces conquered point 445, situated no more than 370 meters from the monastery itself. However, due to the extensive enhancement of the Gustav line defenses, through the use of natural terrain features, and the superior German defense, the Americans never captured the elusive point 593, which was the final obstruction before the monastery could be taken. As a result, the First Battle of Monte Cassino came to an end, opening the door for Lieutenant-General Freyberg and the 2nd New Zealand Division to assume control of the offensive.
Strategy and objectives of the Second Battle of Cassino
There were many compelling incentives for Freyberg to exact a successful offensive at Cassino. Not only did he have his reputation as a newly appointed Corps commander in question, but he also represented the only substantial New Zealand force in World War II. In light of the results achieved by the First Battle of Cassino, and the strategic magnitude of the upcoming attack, the onus was on Freyberg to implement an effective force and accomplish the necessary results. The German opposition, the XIV Panzer Corps, consisted of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 44th Hoch and Deutschmeister Infantry Division and the 5th Mountain Division. Occupying a fortified point, strategy was an integral prerequisite for the success of the operation. As a result, Freyberg and his fellow commanders had to consider the factors that would influence the course of the conflict, and what advantages the allies could exploit in order to succeed. Unfortunately, many of the advantages they identified, such as the allied tank superiority, were annulled by the German manipulation of terrain to obstruct the allied campaign (John A. Ciciarelli, 20 Fields of Battle: Terrain in Military History, 2002). One such obstruction was the installment of a dam on the Rapido River to cause flooding. Consequently, this meant that in planning for the attack, Freyberg had to put more emphasis on the use of infantry, as there was little room for the effective use of tank support due to the difficult terrain (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Alongside the setback of having to develop new tactics, the German position on Monte Cassino also had to be considered as it was well established and fully supplied. As a result, the allies had to employ a strategy that also catered to this factor.
Initially, Freyberg worked alongside Major-General Francis Tuker, the leader of the 4th Indian Division, to establish the key objectives of the 2nd Battle of Cassino. Ultimately, their goal was to threaten the integrity of the Gustav line in order to advance up the Italian Peninsula and draw troops away from the conflict at Anzio. To achieve these objectives, Major-General Tuker suggested a multi-front offensive that comprised of attacks either side of Via Cassalina, as this would succeed in isolating the Germans at Monte Cassino (James Holland, The Approach to Battle, 2000). Concurrently, another attack would occur on the second front further down the Rapido River and advance up the Liri Valley, similar to the British X Corps’ attempt in the preceding battle. Upon proposing this strategy, Tuker asserted that the impetus for doing so was that he thought, “A penetration through the hills to the east of the Cassino feature or across the Rapido lower down, somewhere near St Angelo would have brought the Axis hurrying back from Anzio far more readily than bashing one’s head against the rocks of Cassino” (James Holland, 2000). Freyberg and the other commanding officers endorsed this strategy. Unfortunately however, Tuker fell ill shortly after the plan was devised and without his presence, Freyberg lost confidence and reverted to his own method, which bore a resemblance to the ill-fated frontal assault alluded to by Tuker.
In lieu of the previous plan, Freyberg essentially proposed a giant ‘pincer’ movement, which aimed to break the German defensive position at the monastery and capture the town itself. Although similar to the previous mechanism utilized by the US Fifth army under Clark, Freyberg believed that the incorporation of an attack at the Cassino railway station would expose a viable pathway to the town and the Liri valley. According to the war diaries of the 2nd New Zealand Division, the main assault was to emerge on two fronts. On one front, the 28th (Maori) Battalion was to bridge the Rapido River and capture both the Cassino Railway station and the adjacent hill feature. A and B companies of the battalion would execute this task, and maintain control until armored forces could capitalize on the opening and advance towards Monte Cassino (28th (Maori) Battalion- war diaries, 1st February- 29th February 1944). Simultaneously, on the second front the 4th Indian Division, headed by the 7th Brigade which comprised of the 1st Royal Sussex, 4/16th Punjab Rifles and 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, would advance along higher ground and capture the monastery before progressing to invest the town of Cassino from the southwest (Matthew Parker, Monte Cassino: The Story of the Hardest Fought Battle of World War II, 2004). Subsequent to these two attacks, the New Zealand and Indian forces would unite and proceed up the Liri valley. The success of the operation would lead to the breaking of the Gustav line and a reprieve for the allies at Anzio. The strategy would destroy the key defensive networks established by the Germans and create the opportunity to progress towards Rome.