Geographic Implications for the Battle
As in any conflict, the nature of the strategy employed is particularly dependent on the terrain the battle is contested on. In the case of the battles of Monte Cassino, the terrain had a prevalent influence on the ability for the allies to function as a cohesive and successful entity and ultimately, their capacity to prevail in the Italian Campaign itself. When Hitler ordered the erection of a reinforced defensive line south of Rome, Field Marshall Kesserling understood the holistic advantages that could be obtained to negate the deteriorating German status in the War. In order to accomplish and fulfil his obligation to the German forces, Kesserling proceeded to found what was to become one of the greatest defensive positions in history: thus, the Gustav Line was born. Constructed on the narrowest point of the Italian Peninsula, the Gustav Line was established on the rugged back of the Appienne mountain range. Spanning the length of the country, the mountains were surrounded by steep hills and precipitous slopes, which amalgamated to create a formidable natural obstruction to the allied advance (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Consequently, the allies were faced with the inevitable decision to confront the German defensive network and attack the bastion of German defence. As recognized by the allied commanders, the most viable opportunity to penetrate the Gustav line was the 10km gap in the mountains situated at the mouth of the Liri Valley. Dominated by the surrounding hills and the daunting Benedictine monastery situated 550m above the valley floor, the allies endorsed this point as the optimum location for a concentrated offensive. From this moment, the Battles of Cassino grew to their horrific fruition. But what role did the terrain have in the allied offensive at Cassino, and how did this affect the soldiers present?
Geography of Cassino: the military implications
Before the New Zealand Corps could initiate any substantial offensive on the Gustav line and the reinforced position atop Monte Cassino, they had to contend with the arduous conditions mounted by the surrounding terrain. In accordance with the adage, “Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong”, the allies had nothing resembling the simple plains approaching the base of Monte Cassino that they had hoped for. The first terrain obstacle faced by the allied was the Rapido River: a tributary of the Liri River. Due to the necessity of establishing a bridgehead in every instance of an allied attack, the allies were forced to implement a series of varying fording strategies in order to limit their exposure to enemy observation or fire from their elevated position. This was inherently difficult as not only was there the hazard of the fast flowing current, but the New Zealand Corps also had to counter the 8-20m wide span and the steep, sometimes vertical banks of the river caused by the soft sediment and layers of volcanic ash (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). On many occasions these attacks occurred in the cover of night, such as the offensive launched by the 28th (Maori) Battalion on the 17th of February, which only increased the chance of injury or the arise of complications that were detrimental to the execution of the allied strategy.
Before even reaching the Rapido however, the allies were confronted with lacustrine plains. This constitutes the natural flooding of an expanse with sediment, resulting in a mud-like deposit that denies unrestricted movement. Consequently, vehicular transport, whether it was simple or utilized tracks, could not be used without additional metal sheets to forcibly apply traction to the wheels (Gober, D. F., Allin, G.R., Cherry, C.S., Glassner, C.H and Hagan, G.J., Battle Analysis, May 1984). By virtue of this limitation, the role of infantry became much more prominent in the campaign and equally, the calibre of the soldiers became integral to the course of the battle. This impeded the scope of strategy that could be implemented by the allies, as they had to devise strategy that was both a threat to the integrity of the German position, yet still centralized on the use of soldiers. In combination with the lacustrine plains, the flood plain of the Rapido River itself had further repercussions. In normal conditions, the flood plain was “soft and muddy during this time of the Italian winter” (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). However, the Germans manipulated the natural environment for their own purposes and redirected parts of the river to create “extraordinarily marshy” conditions. The mechanism for achieving this effect revolved around changing the position of the dam in the river in order to redirect the water flow. For soldiers who participated in the First Battle of Cassino, the excess water meant that travelling to their defensive positions often involved crawling through the marsh in full gear, whilst also avoiding semi-submerged German barbed wire and anti-personnel mines (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Despite the serious detriment to the conditions for soldiers in the First Battle, the flooding affected the New Zealand Corps to a lesser extent. The natural terrain features accompanying the hills of Cassino had clear implications for the execution of strategy in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino.
Attacking the Monastery: Geographic implications
Although the approach to Monte Cassino was littered with a multitude of terrain features that inhibited the allied advance, there was nothing that came close to resembling the imposing mountains and the omnipresent shell of the bombed monastery. Historically, Monte Cassino is regarded as one of the most powerful defensive positions in history. This claim is not only attributed to the 550m elevation and the undisrupted view over the expansive Liri valley, but also a range of other geological aspects which contribute to the integrity of the stronghold. According to geologist John A. Ciciarelli, the first of these aspects was the composition of the rock.
“The hard Mesozoic limestone and dolomites of the mountain formed very steep, rocky slopes. Slope angles of about 30-50 degrees are common and the surface is profusely littered with cobbles and boulders” (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002).
Immediately, we perceive the complications imparted by the steep slopes and the loose rocks. At the time, this severely impacted the manoeuvrability of soldiers, whether they were executing an offensive or attempting to transport soldiers to centres for medical care. In conjunction with the slopes, the aforementioned rock fragments were large in size, varying from 5cm to a metre in width, and caused frequent landslides, which threatened established transport routes and further restricted the mobility of soldiers on the hill (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). On the hill itself there were further complications due to an absence of trees. Not only did this lead to an abundant lack of cover from German points of observation, but also a fundamental lack of soil. As a result, the bedrock of Monte Cassino was much more exposed which produced complications of its own. Due to the inherent strength of bedrock, it was difficult for allied soldiers to ‘dig-in’ for cover during the winter nights, which were increasingly generating temperatures well bellow freezing (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Psychologically, this had severe consequences for the morale of soldiers, perpetuated by the pervasive sickness, which was the cost of exposed nights, and adversely impacted their ability to perform their roles as infantry. Compounded with sickness and an eroding of allied morale was the rise in face and eye injuries caused by the shrapnel-like explosion of bedrock when hit by artillery shells or enemy fire. As advanced medical care was scarce in the hills, many soldiers had to endure until a time that they could be transferred to military hospital.
Aside from the natural terrain features, the Germans had also selectively enhanced aspects of the terrain to support their defensive stronghold atop Monte Cassino. For example, they installed barbed wire and mines in positions that ostensibly represented points of cover for the advancing allied assault. Alongside this, they established machine-gun posts within the natural caves on the hill or on the slopes of the hill that camouflaged into the terrain, making it difficult for allied heavy gunners to provide covering fire for ensuing attacks (Battle Analysis, May 1984). On the Monte Cassino spur itself, the Germans incorporated other terrain features to create a mutually supportive ‘double ring’ defensive system that successfully repelled the allied attacks of the Second Battle of Cassino. In order to capture the monastery, troops would have to destroy the cohesion of this network; otherwise their advance could be hampered from multiple fronts (James Holland, The Approach to Battle, 2013).
Ultimately, the Germans managed to successfully exploit the terrain and manipulate it to their own purposes in order to repel allied attacks. Consequently, the allies had to devise strategy that catered to these unfavourable conditions whilst still fulfilling the identified objectives of the campaign. The terrain in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino played a significant role, and demonstrates the advantage of higher ground and preparation in the course of any battle.
Geography of Cassino: the military implications
Before the New Zealand Corps could initiate any substantial offensive on the Gustav line and the reinforced position atop Monte Cassino, they had to contend with the arduous conditions mounted by the surrounding terrain. In accordance with the adage, “Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong”, the allies had nothing resembling the simple plains approaching the base of Monte Cassino that they had hoped for. The first terrain obstacle faced by the allied was the Rapido River: a tributary of the Liri River. Due to the necessity of establishing a bridgehead in every instance of an allied attack, the allies were forced to implement a series of varying fording strategies in order to limit their exposure to enemy observation or fire from their elevated position. This was inherently difficult as not only was there the hazard of the fast flowing current, but the New Zealand Corps also had to counter the 8-20m wide span and the steep, sometimes vertical banks of the river caused by the soft sediment and layers of volcanic ash (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). On many occasions these attacks occurred in the cover of night, such as the offensive launched by the 28th (Maori) Battalion on the 17th of February, which only increased the chance of injury or the arise of complications that were detrimental to the execution of the allied strategy.
Before even reaching the Rapido however, the allies were confronted with lacustrine plains. This constitutes the natural flooding of an expanse with sediment, resulting in a mud-like deposit that denies unrestricted movement. Consequently, vehicular transport, whether it was simple or utilized tracks, could not be used without additional metal sheets to forcibly apply traction to the wheels (Gober, D. F., Allin, G.R., Cherry, C.S., Glassner, C.H and Hagan, G.J., Battle Analysis, May 1984). By virtue of this limitation, the role of infantry became much more prominent in the campaign and equally, the calibre of the soldiers became integral to the course of the battle. This impeded the scope of strategy that could be implemented by the allies, as they had to devise strategy that was both a threat to the integrity of the German position, yet still centralized on the use of soldiers. In combination with the lacustrine plains, the flood plain of the Rapido River itself had further repercussions. In normal conditions, the flood plain was “soft and muddy during this time of the Italian winter” (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). However, the Germans manipulated the natural environment for their own purposes and redirected parts of the river to create “extraordinarily marshy” conditions. The mechanism for achieving this effect revolved around changing the position of the dam in the river in order to redirect the water flow. For soldiers who participated in the First Battle of Cassino, the excess water meant that travelling to their defensive positions often involved crawling through the marsh in full gear, whilst also avoiding semi-submerged German barbed wire and anti-personnel mines (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Despite the serious detriment to the conditions for soldiers in the First Battle, the flooding affected the New Zealand Corps to a lesser extent. The natural terrain features accompanying the hills of Cassino had clear implications for the execution of strategy in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino.
Attacking the Monastery: Geographic implications
Although the approach to Monte Cassino was littered with a multitude of terrain features that inhibited the allied advance, there was nothing that came close to resembling the imposing mountains and the omnipresent shell of the bombed monastery. Historically, Monte Cassino is regarded as one of the most powerful defensive positions in history. This claim is not only attributed to the 550m elevation and the undisrupted view over the expansive Liri valley, but also a range of other geological aspects which contribute to the integrity of the stronghold. According to geologist John A. Ciciarelli, the first of these aspects was the composition of the rock.
“The hard Mesozoic limestone and dolomites of the mountain formed very steep, rocky slopes. Slope angles of about 30-50 degrees are common and the surface is profusely littered with cobbles and boulders” (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002).
Immediately, we perceive the complications imparted by the steep slopes and the loose rocks. At the time, this severely impacted the manoeuvrability of soldiers, whether they were executing an offensive or attempting to transport soldiers to centres for medical care. In conjunction with the slopes, the aforementioned rock fragments were large in size, varying from 5cm to a metre in width, and caused frequent landslides, which threatened established transport routes and further restricted the mobility of soldiers on the hill (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). On the hill itself there were further complications due to an absence of trees. Not only did this lead to an abundant lack of cover from German points of observation, but also a fundamental lack of soil. As a result, the bedrock of Monte Cassino was much more exposed which produced complications of its own. Due to the inherent strength of bedrock, it was difficult for allied soldiers to ‘dig-in’ for cover during the winter nights, which were increasingly generating temperatures well bellow freezing (John A. Ciciarelli, 2002). Psychologically, this had severe consequences for the morale of soldiers, perpetuated by the pervasive sickness, which was the cost of exposed nights, and adversely impacted their ability to perform their roles as infantry. Compounded with sickness and an eroding of allied morale was the rise in face and eye injuries caused by the shrapnel-like explosion of bedrock when hit by artillery shells or enemy fire. As advanced medical care was scarce in the hills, many soldiers had to endure until a time that they could be transferred to military hospital.
Aside from the natural terrain features, the Germans had also selectively enhanced aspects of the terrain to support their defensive stronghold atop Monte Cassino. For example, they installed barbed wire and mines in positions that ostensibly represented points of cover for the advancing allied assault. Alongside this, they established machine-gun posts within the natural caves on the hill or on the slopes of the hill that camouflaged into the terrain, making it difficult for allied heavy gunners to provide covering fire for ensuing attacks (Battle Analysis, May 1984). On the Monte Cassino spur itself, the Germans incorporated other terrain features to create a mutually supportive ‘double ring’ defensive system that successfully repelled the allied attacks of the Second Battle of Cassino. In order to capture the monastery, troops would have to destroy the cohesion of this network; otherwise their advance could be hampered from multiple fronts (James Holland, The Approach to Battle, 2013).
Ultimately, the Germans managed to successfully exploit the terrain and manipulate it to their own purposes in order to repel allied attacks. Consequently, the allies had to devise strategy that catered to these unfavourable conditions whilst still fulfilling the identified objectives of the campaign. The terrain in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino played a significant role, and demonstrates the advantage of higher ground and preparation in the course of any battle.