Assault: The 4th Indian Division's attacks on the Monastery
It was the American bombers’ aerial bombardment of the monastery on the infamous 15th of February that heralded the start of the Second Battle of Monte Cassino. In the allied haste to instigate a major conflict on the Gustav line in order to relieve pressure for the Anzio offensive, they essentially negated the potential for any valid strategic gains to be made from the bombing. In the original plan dictated by Lieutenant-General Freyberg, the bombing was to be a mechanism that allowed the 7th Brigade of the 4th Indian Division to exploit the subsequent confusion and capture the monastery. The 7th Brigade was to prepare for the confrontation by establishing a forward position, from which their two battalions could launch an attack. Before an effective assault on the monastery could occur they had to both create this position and secure Point 593, which was not in-fact in American control as intelligence suggested, as it overlooked the approach to the monastery and could decimate any allied advance through flanking fire. However, due to a lack of coordination between the respective administrations, the New Zealand Corps was not made aware of the details of the bombing and consequently were not prepared for the rapid response that was required when the bombers materialized for the attack. A soldier from the 7th Brigade gives an account that testifies to the surprise and lack of communication in reference to the bombing:
“We went to the door of the command post, a derelict farmhouse, and gazed up into the pale blue sky. There we saw the white trails of many high level bombers. Our first thought was that it was the enemy then someone said, ‘Flying Fortress’, then followed the whistle, swish and blast as the first flights struck the monastery. Almost before the ground ceased to shake the telephones were ringing. One of our companies was within 300 yards from the target and another 800 yards. All had received a plastering and were asking questions with some asperity” (Matthew Parker, 2004).
Due to the lack of communication, the original strategy became obsolete, as the Indian forces could not immediately attack the monastery because they had not yet seized point 593 from the German grasp. They recognized this as being a necessary prerequisite and planned to operate a night offensive to secure this feature. Unfortunately, the time lapse between the bombing and the initiating of the attack proved vital as it allowed the Germans to reconsolidate their position and recuperate from the shock of the bombing.
The First Confrontation at Point 593
The attack, which commenced on the night of the 15th, was to be executed by two companies of the 1st Royal Sussex Battalion. Relatively small numbers were deployed for this, as the avenue of approach to Point 593, colloquially dubbed ‘Snakeshead Ridge’, was very narrow and could only accommodate small numbers of soldiers (Matthew Parker, 2004). As a result, the offensive focussed on the effective use of infantry and predominantly revolved around surprising the Germans: this was complimented by the time of day as it allowed the allied soldiers to advance under the cover of night, and delayed the response time of German soldiers. The strategy was so successful in fact that the Royal Sussex Battalion advanced to within 10m of the German position before they realized an attack was imminent and proceeded to initiate their defence (Battle Analysis, 1984). Due to the extreme proximity of the forces, the conflict was inherently more desperate than other offensives of the campaign. Allied soldier Douglas Hawtin testifies to the ferocity of the conflict: “It was fierce close-quarter fighting. There was I, completely exposed on this bare rock face, operating the wireless with bullets and confusion going all night, no cover whatsoever, not even a pebble” (Matthew Parker, 2004). Terrain influenced the conflict in this regard as the soldiers were confined and had no cover to exploit to their benefit: the Germans truly did have an advantage in an established defensive position. After a deterioration of the conflict to close-quarter fighting the Indian forces regrouped for a final attempt at capturing the hill, however due to a lack of grenades, a crucial component to their strategy, they were forced to withdraw in order to avoid further casualties (Matthew Parker, 2004). The first battle for Point 593 had been successfully repelled.
The Second Confrontation at Point 593
Despite the allied efforts to divert German attention by instigating a massive offensive on the Monte Cassino front, the counteroffensive at Anzio was launched on the 16th of February. Thereupon the order was dispatched to the relevant authorities detailing the need to continue the offensive at Monte Cassino and to capture the monastery itself. Once again, the 1st Royal Sussex Battalion was instructed to capture the monastery, and therefore reattempt to secure Point 593 also. Having learnt from their previous attempt, a new strategy was devised to accomplish this feat. It was proposed that the attack should materialize on two fronts. The first of these, executed by a reinforced B Company, was to approach from the south side of the objective while the second, led by A Company (-), would attack from the north side (Battle Analysis, 1984). After securing point 593, D company would reinforce the position and prepare for the pending German counter attack. Although more promising in that the allies were well equipped and attacking with a larger force on multiple fronts, the strategy did not play out as intended. Much like the previous attempt, German fire was encountered after progressing approximately 50m from the starting line. Yet, the allied strategy had taken this into account and had catered to this by employing a multi-front approach. Unfortunately however, one of the two attacking companies advancing on Point 593 was obstructed by an unmapped crevice and couldn’t fulfil their role as a main attacking party. The reserve company, who were forced into providing a support role for the attacking A Company, were also powerless against this barrier and the crossfire inhibiting their mobility (Battle Analysis, 1984). Despite the efforts made by A Company, there was a lack of force present at the main conflict and so as a result, the attack failed at the accumulative cost of 12 officers and 162 lives. The Royal Sussex Battalion was now rendered unfit for combat (Matthew Parker, 2004).
The Third Confrontation at Point 593
It was now evident to both the allied commanders and their German counterparts that the monastery at Monte Cassino was the integral requirement for the breaking of the Gustav line. Inevitably, the Allied commanders had to devise a strategy that countered the extensive German defensive network on the Monte Cassino massif: it was here that Operation Avenger emerged. Essentially a giant pincer movement, Operation Avenger comprised of two independent attacks. The first was a series of offensives headed by the 4th Indian Division, which aimed to capture the monastery and threaten the integrity of the German position on the massif. Simultaneously, the 2nd New Zealand Division, executed by the 28th (Maori) Battalion, would attack the Cassino railway station in order to open a route for an armoured force to exploit the opening and secure the Liri Valley.
On the Monte Cassino massif, the assault led by the 4th Indian Division began at midnight. As the attack occurred at night, the allies had the initial advantage insofar that the Germans could not see their approach or the number of troops they faced. However, this was eventually countered through the use of flares that briefly illuminated the battlefield allowing the Germans to observe the enemy advance on their positions (Matthew Parker, 2004). The initial attack on point 593 sustained many casualties from crossfire from other German defensive positions, but through perseverance a smaller contingent managed to reach Point 593. As in the second attempt though, the German position was too well established to dislodge with as few men as remained after the approach to the hill. Because of the inability to secure Point 593, the subsequent objectives could not be fulfilled. As a result, the company were prevented from advancing along the ridge towards the monastery or halting the fire originating from adjacent enemy positions (Matthew Parker, 2004). This was detrimental to the subsequent attacks, which ultimately depended on the capturing of point 593. The 1/9th Gurkha’s, who intended to advance towards Monte Cassino monastery, were faced with attacking fire from the unsecured German positions surrounding point 593. Similarly the 1/2nd Gurkhas fell subject to aggressive German response to the confrontation and were forced from their intended route in search of cover from the devastating fire (Matthew Parker, 2004). During this process, the company drove through what appeared to be gorse but was actually interlaced with barbed wire and anti-personnel mines. Almost the entirety of the leading group was decimated and those who avoided the trap were caught by fire from multiple directions (Battle Analysis, 1984). The remaining companies eventually managed to reach the summit of point 445, which was less than 800 meters from the monastery, but suffered a similar fate at the hands of the well established and extensive German defence network. By this stage it was reported that Point 593 had been cleared by the attacking battalion, however when the reinforcing platoons advanced on the position with the objective of securing it, the Germans had recaptured the allusive point and defended it thereinafter. With the massive number of casualties and the unrelenting German defence, the allied commanders were compelled to terminate the offensive before their attacking force was furthered destroyed due to ignorance of the despondent allied situation. The allies came within 800 metres of the walls of the monastery but were ultimately repelled by the German position. The attack on the night of the 17th of February was the last attempt made by the allies in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino to capture the monastery.
“We went to the door of the command post, a derelict farmhouse, and gazed up into the pale blue sky. There we saw the white trails of many high level bombers. Our first thought was that it was the enemy then someone said, ‘Flying Fortress’, then followed the whistle, swish and blast as the first flights struck the monastery. Almost before the ground ceased to shake the telephones were ringing. One of our companies was within 300 yards from the target and another 800 yards. All had received a plastering and were asking questions with some asperity” (Matthew Parker, 2004).
Due to the lack of communication, the original strategy became obsolete, as the Indian forces could not immediately attack the monastery because they had not yet seized point 593 from the German grasp. They recognized this as being a necessary prerequisite and planned to operate a night offensive to secure this feature. Unfortunately, the time lapse between the bombing and the initiating of the attack proved vital as it allowed the Germans to reconsolidate their position and recuperate from the shock of the bombing.
The First Confrontation at Point 593
The attack, which commenced on the night of the 15th, was to be executed by two companies of the 1st Royal Sussex Battalion. Relatively small numbers were deployed for this, as the avenue of approach to Point 593, colloquially dubbed ‘Snakeshead Ridge’, was very narrow and could only accommodate small numbers of soldiers (Matthew Parker, 2004). As a result, the offensive focussed on the effective use of infantry and predominantly revolved around surprising the Germans: this was complimented by the time of day as it allowed the allied soldiers to advance under the cover of night, and delayed the response time of German soldiers. The strategy was so successful in fact that the Royal Sussex Battalion advanced to within 10m of the German position before they realized an attack was imminent and proceeded to initiate their defence (Battle Analysis, 1984). Due to the extreme proximity of the forces, the conflict was inherently more desperate than other offensives of the campaign. Allied soldier Douglas Hawtin testifies to the ferocity of the conflict: “It was fierce close-quarter fighting. There was I, completely exposed on this bare rock face, operating the wireless with bullets and confusion going all night, no cover whatsoever, not even a pebble” (Matthew Parker, 2004). Terrain influenced the conflict in this regard as the soldiers were confined and had no cover to exploit to their benefit: the Germans truly did have an advantage in an established defensive position. After a deterioration of the conflict to close-quarter fighting the Indian forces regrouped for a final attempt at capturing the hill, however due to a lack of grenades, a crucial component to their strategy, they were forced to withdraw in order to avoid further casualties (Matthew Parker, 2004). The first battle for Point 593 had been successfully repelled.
The Second Confrontation at Point 593
Despite the allied efforts to divert German attention by instigating a massive offensive on the Monte Cassino front, the counteroffensive at Anzio was launched on the 16th of February. Thereupon the order was dispatched to the relevant authorities detailing the need to continue the offensive at Monte Cassino and to capture the monastery itself. Once again, the 1st Royal Sussex Battalion was instructed to capture the monastery, and therefore reattempt to secure Point 593 also. Having learnt from their previous attempt, a new strategy was devised to accomplish this feat. It was proposed that the attack should materialize on two fronts. The first of these, executed by a reinforced B Company, was to approach from the south side of the objective while the second, led by A Company (-), would attack from the north side (Battle Analysis, 1984). After securing point 593, D company would reinforce the position and prepare for the pending German counter attack. Although more promising in that the allies were well equipped and attacking with a larger force on multiple fronts, the strategy did not play out as intended. Much like the previous attempt, German fire was encountered after progressing approximately 50m from the starting line. Yet, the allied strategy had taken this into account and had catered to this by employing a multi-front approach. Unfortunately however, one of the two attacking companies advancing on Point 593 was obstructed by an unmapped crevice and couldn’t fulfil their role as a main attacking party. The reserve company, who were forced into providing a support role for the attacking A Company, were also powerless against this barrier and the crossfire inhibiting their mobility (Battle Analysis, 1984). Despite the efforts made by A Company, there was a lack of force present at the main conflict and so as a result, the attack failed at the accumulative cost of 12 officers and 162 lives. The Royal Sussex Battalion was now rendered unfit for combat (Matthew Parker, 2004).
The Third Confrontation at Point 593
It was now evident to both the allied commanders and their German counterparts that the monastery at Monte Cassino was the integral requirement for the breaking of the Gustav line. Inevitably, the Allied commanders had to devise a strategy that countered the extensive German defensive network on the Monte Cassino massif: it was here that Operation Avenger emerged. Essentially a giant pincer movement, Operation Avenger comprised of two independent attacks. The first was a series of offensives headed by the 4th Indian Division, which aimed to capture the monastery and threaten the integrity of the German position on the massif. Simultaneously, the 2nd New Zealand Division, executed by the 28th (Maori) Battalion, would attack the Cassino railway station in order to open a route for an armoured force to exploit the opening and secure the Liri Valley.
On the Monte Cassino massif, the assault led by the 4th Indian Division began at midnight. As the attack occurred at night, the allies had the initial advantage insofar that the Germans could not see their approach or the number of troops they faced. However, this was eventually countered through the use of flares that briefly illuminated the battlefield allowing the Germans to observe the enemy advance on their positions (Matthew Parker, 2004). The initial attack on point 593 sustained many casualties from crossfire from other German defensive positions, but through perseverance a smaller contingent managed to reach Point 593. As in the second attempt though, the German position was too well established to dislodge with as few men as remained after the approach to the hill. Because of the inability to secure Point 593, the subsequent objectives could not be fulfilled. As a result, the company were prevented from advancing along the ridge towards the monastery or halting the fire originating from adjacent enemy positions (Matthew Parker, 2004). This was detrimental to the subsequent attacks, which ultimately depended on the capturing of point 593. The 1/9th Gurkha’s, who intended to advance towards Monte Cassino monastery, were faced with attacking fire from the unsecured German positions surrounding point 593. Similarly the 1/2nd Gurkhas fell subject to aggressive German response to the confrontation and were forced from their intended route in search of cover from the devastating fire (Matthew Parker, 2004). During this process, the company drove through what appeared to be gorse but was actually interlaced with barbed wire and anti-personnel mines. Almost the entirety of the leading group was decimated and those who avoided the trap were caught by fire from multiple directions (Battle Analysis, 1984). The remaining companies eventually managed to reach the summit of point 445, which was less than 800 meters from the monastery, but suffered a similar fate at the hands of the well established and extensive German defence network. By this stage it was reported that Point 593 had been cleared by the attacking battalion, however when the reinforcing platoons advanced on the position with the objective of securing it, the Germans had recaptured the allusive point and defended it thereinafter. With the massive number of casualties and the unrelenting German defence, the allied commanders were compelled to terminate the offensive before their attacking force was furthered destroyed due to ignorance of the despondent allied situation. The allies came within 800 metres of the walls of the monastery but were ultimately repelled by the German position. The attack on the night of the 17th of February was the last attempt made by the allies in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino to capture the monastery.