Overview: The Italian Campaign and the road to New Zealand's involvement
Before we can ascertain the significance of the Battles of Monte Cassino, and their role in breaking the bastion of German defence along the Gustav line, we must first understand the key motivations behind the instigating of the Italian Campaign itself. This is a point of contention in history as there are multiple reasons as to why the Allies established a major offensive campaign at such a late stage in the war. However, according to historians, the dominant reasons appear to be the opening of a new offensive front in close proximity to the German border, and the benefits this would create for the allied forces. The decision to initiate a major campaign in Italy was made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in May 1943, as the forces engaged in the conflict would represent both of these nations. In order to achieve this, they delayed the invasion of France and instead launched the Italian Campaign by attacking Sicily on the 10th of July 1943. But what advantages did they perceive could be attained through the course of the campaign?
Preceding the decision to invade Italy, there was extensive debate between Britain and America over the most effective method to defeat Germany and end the devastating war in Europe. Each country’s proposed method reflected their historical preference and catered to their respective strengths. Consequently, Britain advocated a strategy centralized around peripheral naval attacks to undermine the German morale, whereas America argued that a conjoint invasion of France would destroy German resistance (History.com staff, History.com, 2009). Eventually it was agreed that the strategic advantages of an allied success in Italy would be a turning point for the course of the war. The driving motivations that influenced the decision to open a new front focused on a number of potential gains from the conflict, with the most significant of these being the prospective Italian capitulation. This occurrence would be holistically beneficial for the entirety of the allied war effort due to the ensuing consequences. It was postulated that an Italian capitulation would secure the allied dominance of the Mediterranean Sea allowing for less constricted communication with allied countries situated in this area and it would remove a major German ally from the European war, hindering their ability to continue a powerful opposition to the allied offensive. Furthermore, it would relieve pressure on the Eastern front due to the necessity to redeploy in order to defend a newly exposed weakness (Christopher Pugsley, The Battles for Monte Cassino: Central Italy, 2004). Aside from the strategic gain, there was also an allure to the concept of chasing a broken German army after the success of the North African campaign. In combination, these consequences would make the proposed Normandy landings more powerful as not only would German troops be extensively distributed in the attempt to defend multiple fronts, but also the morale of the German army as an entity would be severely damaged, which only intensified the chance of allied success.
As Hitler realised the danger of an allied victory in Italy, he ordered Field Marshall Kesserling to establish reinforced lines of defence, similar to the Maginot line of World War I, in the attempt to shatter the morale of the advancing enemy forces. The defensive line of relevance to the Battles of Monte Cassino was the infamous ‘Gustav Line’. Erected along the narrowest point of the Italian Peninsula and traversing across some of the most difficult terrain in the country, the Gustav Line was a bastion of German defence due to the inherent strength of the position. In conjunction with the impositions of the terrain, the German command had dedicated 16 divisions to the defence of the Italian frontier. For a successful operation in Italy, the allied command identified the need for more divisions to counter the German forces and the established position of strength. It was at this point that the 2nd New Zealand Division came to the fore.
Prior to the initiation of the Italian campaign, New Zealand had been involved in a successful campaign in North Africa. After an allied triumph in this conflict, there was debate as to where to progress next. Due to the autonomous nature of the 2nd New Zealand Division and their ultimate deference to the New Zealand government, this was a decision that was to be made by the government with the advice of division commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg. It was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who initially petitioned the government to reinstate the division’s involvement in the Mediterranean theatre and requested their participation in the invasion of Sicily: the opening act of the Italian campaign. However, there was debate as to whether the country should follow in the tracks of Australia who pulled back from their commitments in the Middle East to partake in the Pacific conflict. After declining the request from Churchill, the issue was reconsidered when the offensive in Italy became more urgent in May of 1943. Consequently, Prime Minister Peter Fraser successfully convinced cabinet to allow the New Zealand Division to support British and American forces in the Italian Campaign. The execution of this decision was swift and by November, most of the division had reached Italy and was preparing for the conflict to come (Christopher Pugsley, 2004).
Preceding the decision to invade Italy, there was extensive debate between Britain and America over the most effective method to defeat Germany and end the devastating war in Europe. Each country’s proposed method reflected their historical preference and catered to their respective strengths. Consequently, Britain advocated a strategy centralized around peripheral naval attacks to undermine the German morale, whereas America argued that a conjoint invasion of France would destroy German resistance (History.com staff, History.com, 2009). Eventually it was agreed that the strategic advantages of an allied success in Italy would be a turning point for the course of the war. The driving motivations that influenced the decision to open a new front focused on a number of potential gains from the conflict, with the most significant of these being the prospective Italian capitulation. This occurrence would be holistically beneficial for the entirety of the allied war effort due to the ensuing consequences. It was postulated that an Italian capitulation would secure the allied dominance of the Mediterranean Sea allowing for less constricted communication with allied countries situated in this area and it would remove a major German ally from the European war, hindering their ability to continue a powerful opposition to the allied offensive. Furthermore, it would relieve pressure on the Eastern front due to the necessity to redeploy in order to defend a newly exposed weakness (Christopher Pugsley, The Battles for Monte Cassino: Central Italy, 2004). Aside from the strategic gain, there was also an allure to the concept of chasing a broken German army after the success of the North African campaign. In combination, these consequences would make the proposed Normandy landings more powerful as not only would German troops be extensively distributed in the attempt to defend multiple fronts, but also the morale of the German army as an entity would be severely damaged, which only intensified the chance of allied success.
As Hitler realised the danger of an allied victory in Italy, he ordered Field Marshall Kesserling to establish reinforced lines of defence, similar to the Maginot line of World War I, in the attempt to shatter the morale of the advancing enemy forces. The defensive line of relevance to the Battles of Monte Cassino was the infamous ‘Gustav Line’. Erected along the narrowest point of the Italian Peninsula and traversing across some of the most difficult terrain in the country, the Gustav Line was a bastion of German defence due to the inherent strength of the position. In conjunction with the impositions of the terrain, the German command had dedicated 16 divisions to the defence of the Italian frontier. For a successful operation in Italy, the allied command identified the need for more divisions to counter the German forces and the established position of strength. It was at this point that the 2nd New Zealand Division came to the fore.
Prior to the initiation of the Italian campaign, New Zealand had been involved in a successful campaign in North Africa. After an allied triumph in this conflict, there was debate as to where to progress next. Due to the autonomous nature of the 2nd New Zealand Division and their ultimate deference to the New Zealand government, this was a decision that was to be made by the government with the advice of division commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg. It was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who initially petitioned the government to reinstate the division’s involvement in the Mediterranean theatre and requested their participation in the invasion of Sicily: the opening act of the Italian campaign. However, there was debate as to whether the country should follow in the tracks of Australia who pulled back from their commitments in the Middle East to partake in the Pacific conflict. After declining the request from Churchill, the issue was reconsidered when the offensive in Italy became more urgent in May of 1943. Consequently, Prime Minister Peter Fraser successfully convinced cabinet to allow the New Zealand Division to support British and American forces in the Italian Campaign. The execution of this decision was swift and by November, most of the division had reached Italy and was preparing for the conflict to come (Christopher Pugsley, 2004).