Controversy- The Bombing of the Monastery
The bombing of the Monastery at Monte Cassino is a key point of contention in military history, and the debate emanating from this controversy is still prevalent today. The controversy itself stems from the supposedly tenuous justification for the military act, as it is widely argued that the bombing was “one of the most inexcusable bombings of the war” (Allan R. Millett) and an abhorrent act of sacrilege. On these grounds, the argument progresses to analyse whether there was foundation for the instigating of the bombing, the supposed strategic gain of this action and ultimately, who was responsible for the attack. However, some historians defend the motives for this event, as they perceive a tangible benefit for the allied soldiers on both a morale and tactical front. With the support of notable historians such as John Tonkin-Covell and Glyn Harper, this theory asserts that there was valid cause for the bombing, and that the consequences of this action are far outweighed by the resulting strategic benefits. The ubiquitous historical debate raises the key questions: what were the key motivations for the bombing of the monastery? Who was responsible for this decision? And what were the consequences of this action?
Key motivations for the bombing
Firstly, we must understand the obfuscated motivations for the bombing of the monastery itself. One of the central rationales for attack was the alleged German use of the abbey as an 600 meter high observation point, overlooking and dominating the Allied occupied Liri Valley. Although unconfirmed, subsequent to the first Battle of Cassino there were reports of sniper fire originating from the monastery and the movements of German troops around the building, which consequently provoked rumours throughout the New Zealand Corps that the abbey was occupied. New evidence arose to support this claim when American Lieutenant-General Ira Eaker and Deputy Theatre Commander General Jacob Deavers, flew over the top of the abbey in an observation plane in order to prove the validity of the accusations. During their flight they reportedly observed, “German soldiers in the courtyard, as well as something they thought was a radio antenna; they also spotted a machine-gun nest about 50 yards from the abbey wall” (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, The Battles of Monte Cassino: The Campaign and its Controversies, 2013). The authenticity of this report was ultimately persuasive and fostered disturbance within the corps, and support of the now pervasive fear of the occupation of the monastery. However, it is not only historians who dispute this point of contention, reflecting on misconstrued facts and the secondary interpretations of others, but also individuals who were present in the abbey itself. Frido von Senger und Etterlin, the German commander responsible for this sector, refutes the claims that his troops occupied the abbey, and maintains that he honoured Field Marshall Kesselring’s agreement of December 1943 with The Vatican not to impinge on the sanctity of the grounds. Senger wrote in his personal war diary: “I was glad to be in charge of the ‘neutralization’ of the abbey, because no one likes to be answerable to history for the destruction of a monument of such cultural value for reason of tactical advantage”. He also asserts that under typical military conditions, the abbey would not be used as an outpost as it was standard military practice to establish observation points at positions that were unlikely to be an objective of an enemy assault (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). Indeed Gregorio Diamare, the Abbott-Bishop of Monte Cassino himself, testifies that there were never any German soldiers occupying “the enclosure of the sacred monastery of Monte Cassino” in a statement made on February 15th 1944. This is one of the more compelling pieces of evidence, which acts to refute the allegations as to the German occupation of the abbey. Due to the contrary views of participants in the event and the multitude of historians’ opinions, the debate as to the occupation of the monastery remains inconclusive to this day.
Despite the evidence supporting either side of the historical argument, some historians claim that the purported occupation was not a motive for the bombing in its own right. On these grounds, it is widely debated whether the instigating of the bombing was in-fact influenced by other factors, such as the morale implications that were inexorably linked to the alleged occupation. Due to the continuous presence of the monastery as a dominating terrain feature, soldiers within the New Zealand Corps were experiencing a loss of morale. A New Zealand soldier’s account conveys the manifestation of this occurrence:
“Looking up at about a 45-degree angle gave you the feeling that with the view the enemy had, he could see your every move, even in the trench. It was an eerie feeling and it seemed that no matter where you were, the monastery always looked down, watching”. (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, 2013)
The effect on the morale of soldiers was widespread as other accounts of the detrimental impact on the psyche of the troops emerged. Historian Rick Atkinson alluded to this in his writing stating;
“But wherever they marched, or dug, or died, the abbey atop Monte Cassino seemed to loom over them. ‘You could never lose it’ a British soldier reported; ‘it was always there looking at you.’ … Fred Majdalany spoke for many: ‘That brooding monastery ate into our souls’.” (Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The war in Sicily and Italy 1943-44, published 2007)
Ultimately, the indispensible element of any successful army is the morale of its soldiers. In the case of the Second Battle of Monte Cassino, the allied commanders could not afford the risk of a shattering of morale for the sake of a building, as this was the cornerstone to their efforts to bypass the Gustav line and accomplish the objectives of the Italian Campaign. Consequently, it was almost unequivocal that the bombing had to occur so as to demonstrate that the lives and wellbeing of the allied soldiers were more valuable than a culturally significant building (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). Indeed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme commander of the Mediterranean Theatre implicitly endorsed this decision through his statement concerning the culturally significant monuments within central Europe. In his opinion, the path of war should avoid the destruction of the buildings that pertain to a culture that has contributed to our global identity, except when it is at the expense of human lives. It was for the reasons of the potential occupation of the monastery and the threat this had to allied success, and the morale implications for allied soldiers that the decision to bomb the Monte Cassino monastery was approved.
Aside from the justification behind the bombing in the context of the strategic gains at Monte Cassino, there was also an influence from the allied position at Anzio. As historians have extensively analysed, the conflicts at Anzio and Monte Cassino were inextricably linked; the events of one conflict influenced the decisions and strategy of the other. It was this premise that resulted in the rushed decision to execute the bombing of the monastery. Intelligence received by the allies suggested that a major German counter-offensive was imminent, and to inhibit the German ability to successfully perform this offensive, threatening action on the Gustav line was required (Gober, D. F., Allin, G.R., Cherry, C.S., Glassner, C.H and Hagan, G.J., Battle Analysis, May 1984). This ultimately manifested itself in the bombing of the monastery on February 15th 1944. Commencing at 9.25am, the initial strike constituted two waves of bombers dropping 500 tons of bombs: these ranged from 257 tons of 500lb to 59 tons of 100lb incendiaries. The second wave utilized more powerful explosives in order to successfully destroy the monastery, as the previous wave had little impact on the rock walls of the building. Consequently, 283 1000lb bombs were dropped (James Holland, 2000). By the end of the day, what was previously the imposing Benedictine Monastery was reduced to an appalling shell of its former glory.
Responsibility for the bombing
The contention over the bombing of the monastery is a perpetually fervent debate and the natural extension of this argument is the question over who was actually responsible. Historically, Lieutenant-General Freyberg has been allocated most of the blame. However, this seems inherently unfair as for the bombing to occur, the decision had to be sanctioned by the proper authorities. Initially, Major-General Francis Tuker made the request as his troops had been directed to make the assault on the monastery. Not only did he want the obstruction to be cleared for the sake of his soldiers’ morale, but he also believed that when confronted with an enemy attack, the German troops on Monte Cassino would be unable to resist the allure of the monastery as a fortified defensive position (Glyn Harper, John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). It was Tuker’s intention that if the monastery were to bombed, he could exploit the tumultuous period that followed to capture the abbey and secure Monte Cassino for the allies. Tuker appealed to Freyberg to advocate this strategy to his superiors. Freyberg agreed to do so and made an official request of General Mark Clark on the 12th of February 1944 for the monastery to be added to the target list. Clark has gone on record as being opposed to the idea of the bombing, as he had seen no compelling evidence to suggest that the Germans were utilizing the monastery as a defensive position. Consequently, this resulted in inhibitions as to whether such a culturally significant building should be sacrificed for the sake of a New Zealand general’s request. In spite of this, the final decision was made by General Harold Alexander who agreed that, regrettably, the bombing of the monastery was a necessity.
Historians John Tonkin-Covell and Glyn Harper take yet a different stance concerning the responsibility for the bombing. They assert that when the Germans incorporated the abbey into their defences on the Gustav line, the contention as to whether it was occupied or not became irrelevant. On these grounds they argue that the area surrounding the abbey was inherently advantageous due to its elevation, and that the allies could not allow this advantage to proceed unchallenged. It follows that any mechanism used, whether it be bombing or artillery, would cause severe damage to the monastery due to the sheer proximity of German positions (Glyn Harper, John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). Eaker supports these claims in his response to historian Martin Blumenson’s book, Monte Cassino and the Bombs:
“The considerable space the author devotes to a discussion of whether the Germans were actually inside the monastery is immaterial since all now agree that the Germans did in fact occupy and fortify the mountain surrounding the monastery. It would have been impossible to deny them this vital observation and communication high ground either with bombs or artillery without serious damage to the Abbey”
Despite the fact that the chain of command was fully utilized in the decision making process concerning the monastery, and there are contrary arguments defending the allies justification and apportioning the blame to the Germans, Freyberg still maintains the majority of the blame for the bombing. This is usually accredited to the fact that the proposed strategic gains from the bombing were never secured due to a lack of coordination with the 4th Indian Division infantry who were to make to final assault. The global implications of this decision and the consequences of the bombing for New Zealanders are diverse and still prevalent.
Key motivations for the bombing
Firstly, we must understand the obfuscated motivations for the bombing of the monastery itself. One of the central rationales for attack was the alleged German use of the abbey as an 600 meter high observation point, overlooking and dominating the Allied occupied Liri Valley. Although unconfirmed, subsequent to the first Battle of Cassino there were reports of sniper fire originating from the monastery and the movements of German troops around the building, which consequently provoked rumours throughout the New Zealand Corps that the abbey was occupied. New evidence arose to support this claim when American Lieutenant-General Ira Eaker and Deputy Theatre Commander General Jacob Deavers, flew over the top of the abbey in an observation plane in order to prove the validity of the accusations. During their flight they reportedly observed, “German soldiers in the courtyard, as well as something they thought was a radio antenna; they also spotted a machine-gun nest about 50 yards from the abbey wall” (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, The Battles of Monte Cassino: The Campaign and its Controversies, 2013). The authenticity of this report was ultimately persuasive and fostered disturbance within the corps, and support of the now pervasive fear of the occupation of the monastery. However, it is not only historians who dispute this point of contention, reflecting on misconstrued facts and the secondary interpretations of others, but also individuals who were present in the abbey itself. Frido von Senger und Etterlin, the German commander responsible for this sector, refutes the claims that his troops occupied the abbey, and maintains that he honoured Field Marshall Kesselring’s agreement of December 1943 with The Vatican not to impinge on the sanctity of the grounds. Senger wrote in his personal war diary: “I was glad to be in charge of the ‘neutralization’ of the abbey, because no one likes to be answerable to history for the destruction of a monument of such cultural value for reason of tactical advantage”. He also asserts that under typical military conditions, the abbey would not be used as an outpost as it was standard military practice to establish observation points at positions that were unlikely to be an objective of an enemy assault (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). Indeed Gregorio Diamare, the Abbott-Bishop of Monte Cassino himself, testifies that there were never any German soldiers occupying “the enclosure of the sacred monastery of Monte Cassino” in a statement made on February 15th 1944. This is one of the more compelling pieces of evidence, which acts to refute the allegations as to the German occupation of the abbey. Due to the contrary views of participants in the event and the multitude of historians’ opinions, the debate as to the occupation of the monastery remains inconclusive to this day.
Despite the evidence supporting either side of the historical argument, some historians claim that the purported occupation was not a motive for the bombing in its own right. On these grounds, it is widely debated whether the instigating of the bombing was in-fact influenced by other factors, such as the morale implications that were inexorably linked to the alleged occupation. Due to the continuous presence of the monastery as a dominating terrain feature, soldiers within the New Zealand Corps were experiencing a loss of morale. A New Zealand soldier’s account conveys the manifestation of this occurrence:
“Looking up at about a 45-degree angle gave you the feeling that with the view the enemy had, he could see your every move, even in the trench. It was an eerie feeling and it seemed that no matter where you were, the monastery always looked down, watching”. (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, 2013)
The effect on the morale of soldiers was widespread as other accounts of the detrimental impact on the psyche of the troops emerged. Historian Rick Atkinson alluded to this in his writing stating;
“But wherever they marched, or dug, or died, the abbey atop Monte Cassino seemed to loom over them. ‘You could never lose it’ a British soldier reported; ‘it was always there looking at you.’ … Fred Majdalany spoke for many: ‘That brooding monastery ate into our souls’.” (Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The war in Sicily and Italy 1943-44, published 2007)
Ultimately, the indispensible element of any successful army is the morale of its soldiers. In the case of the Second Battle of Monte Cassino, the allied commanders could not afford the risk of a shattering of morale for the sake of a building, as this was the cornerstone to their efforts to bypass the Gustav line and accomplish the objectives of the Italian Campaign. Consequently, it was almost unequivocal that the bombing had to occur so as to demonstrate that the lives and wellbeing of the allied soldiers were more valuable than a culturally significant building (Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). Indeed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme commander of the Mediterranean Theatre implicitly endorsed this decision through his statement concerning the culturally significant monuments within central Europe. In his opinion, the path of war should avoid the destruction of the buildings that pertain to a culture that has contributed to our global identity, except when it is at the expense of human lives. It was for the reasons of the potential occupation of the monastery and the threat this had to allied success, and the morale implications for allied soldiers that the decision to bomb the Monte Cassino monastery was approved.
Aside from the justification behind the bombing in the context of the strategic gains at Monte Cassino, there was also an influence from the allied position at Anzio. As historians have extensively analysed, the conflicts at Anzio and Monte Cassino were inextricably linked; the events of one conflict influenced the decisions and strategy of the other. It was this premise that resulted in the rushed decision to execute the bombing of the monastery. Intelligence received by the allies suggested that a major German counter-offensive was imminent, and to inhibit the German ability to successfully perform this offensive, threatening action on the Gustav line was required (Gober, D. F., Allin, G.R., Cherry, C.S., Glassner, C.H and Hagan, G.J., Battle Analysis, May 1984). This ultimately manifested itself in the bombing of the monastery on February 15th 1944. Commencing at 9.25am, the initial strike constituted two waves of bombers dropping 500 tons of bombs: these ranged from 257 tons of 500lb to 59 tons of 100lb incendiaries. The second wave utilized more powerful explosives in order to successfully destroy the monastery, as the previous wave had little impact on the rock walls of the building. Consequently, 283 1000lb bombs were dropped (James Holland, 2000). By the end of the day, what was previously the imposing Benedictine Monastery was reduced to an appalling shell of its former glory.
Responsibility for the bombing
The contention over the bombing of the monastery is a perpetually fervent debate and the natural extension of this argument is the question over who was actually responsible. Historically, Lieutenant-General Freyberg has been allocated most of the blame. However, this seems inherently unfair as for the bombing to occur, the decision had to be sanctioned by the proper authorities. Initially, Major-General Francis Tuker made the request as his troops had been directed to make the assault on the monastery. Not only did he want the obstruction to be cleared for the sake of his soldiers’ morale, but he also believed that when confronted with an enemy attack, the German troops on Monte Cassino would be unable to resist the allure of the monastery as a fortified defensive position (Glyn Harper, John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). It was Tuker’s intention that if the monastery were to bombed, he could exploit the tumultuous period that followed to capture the abbey and secure Monte Cassino for the allies. Tuker appealed to Freyberg to advocate this strategy to his superiors. Freyberg agreed to do so and made an official request of General Mark Clark on the 12th of February 1944 for the monastery to be added to the target list. Clark has gone on record as being opposed to the idea of the bombing, as he had seen no compelling evidence to suggest that the Germans were utilizing the monastery as a defensive position. Consequently, this resulted in inhibitions as to whether such a culturally significant building should be sacrificed for the sake of a New Zealand general’s request. In spite of this, the final decision was made by General Harold Alexander who agreed that, regrettably, the bombing of the monastery was a necessity.
Historians John Tonkin-Covell and Glyn Harper take yet a different stance concerning the responsibility for the bombing. They assert that when the Germans incorporated the abbey into their defences on the Gustav line, the contention as to whether it was occupied or not became irrelevant. On these grounds they argue that the area surrounding the abbey was inherently advantageous due to its elevation, and that the allies could not allow this advantage to proceed unchallenged. It follows that any mechanism used, whether it be bombing or artillery, would cause severe damage to the monastery due to the sheer proximity of German positions (Glyn Harper, John Tonkin-Covell, 2013). Eaker supports these claims in his response to historian Martin Blumenson’s book, Monte Cassino and the Bombs:
“The considerable space the author devotes to a discussion of whether the Germans were actually inside the monastery is immaterial since all now agree that the Germans did in fact occupy and fortify the mountain surrounding the monastery. It would have been impossible to deny them this vital observation and communication high ground either with bombs or artillery without serious damage to the Abbey”
Despite the fact that the chain of command was fully utilized in the decision making process concerning the monastery, and there are contrary arguments defending the allies justification and apportioning the blame to the Germans, Freyberg still maintains the majority of the blame for the bombing. This is usually accredited to the fact that the proposed strategic gains from the bombing were never secured due to a lack of coordination with the 4th Indian Division infantry who were to make to final assault. The global implications of this decision and the consequences of the bombing for New Zealanders are diverse and still prevalent.